Germany‘s effort to confront Hitler‘s crimes was halting at first, but today the Germans have accomplished a major feat: collective acceptance of moral responsibility for their country‘s past.
To get a sense of the playbook that Tehran might consult in any future conflict with the United States, Washington should pay close attention to what the Iranians have learned in Syria.
Robert Kagan‘s thought-provoking essay (‘The New German Question,‘ May/June 2019) addresses the important issue of how a collapse of the European Union and the liberal international order might affect Germany and its role within Europe. He concludes that such a breakdown would bring back the preWorld War II ‘German question,‘ which European integration and the Atlantic alliance were in part meant to resolve. But Kaga
In his essay ‘Democracy Demotion‘ (July/August 2019), Larry Diamond laments the decline in prominence of U.S. democracy promotion. It is refreshing to have an American expert lift a mirror to the United States, writing that the country ‘has to repair its own broken democracy‘ before it can take up again the mantle of democracy promotion internationally. But Diamond betrays his biases when, expressing concern about &lsquo
Putin‘s reputation as a champion against a supposedly predatory West has solidified among the pubic, and hard-liners within Putin‘s circle. His next target? Countercultural art, film, and speech.
In recent days, Moscow has drastically increased its military assistance to Syria.Observers in the West have described the pivotas a bold and decisive,providing an opportunity for U.S. President Barack Obama to climb down from his failed Syria strategy and cede initiative to ‘a strengthened alliance of Russia, Iran, and Syria.‘ Yet Russia‘s latest act of aggression should not be seen as a sign of strength but a cry for help.
Russia‘s annexation of Crimea was known to come with both risks and costs. What few in Moscow realized was just how expensive this conquest would be.
A frozen conflict is the least likely medium-term outcome for Ukraine. Far more likely is that Russia will use force to achieve a settlement endowing the country‘s Russophile regions with a disproportionate influence over national politics.
Serbian Prime Minister AleksandarVucic has signaled his intent to align the nation‘s interests with the United States and Western Europe, but his history in radical politics and close ties to Russia indicate that the nation‘s Westward march is not as clear cut as his words make it appear.
Once more, the Kremlin is increasingly assertive in the Middle East, and once more,it has surprised the West. Emboldened by its perceived success in addressing regional challenges and capitalizing on opportunities, it has gotten closer than ever to its key diplomatic objective: acquiring a regional status on par with Washington‘s.
The Russian military has more to worry about than upgrading its equipment. Whereas the Soviet Union boasted an armed force of more than five million soldiers, Russia is now having trouble filling the ranks of an army one-fifth as big.
Over the past several years, Russia‘s demographic picture has brightened. In 2012, live births outnumbered deaths for the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union. That indicator has remained marginally positive, and others have also begun to improve. These reversals have been modest, but they have been enough for the Kremlin to proclaim victory in its decades-long fight against demographic decline. That conclusion, however, is ext
The lessons for Greece are clear: Unless accompanied by substantial institutional reforms, neither austerity nor Grexit will work. However, in a democracy, fundamental institutional change cannot be imposed from outside-it requires strong political will and public support. Despite the deep Greek crisis, the country still seems to lack both.
Moscow‘s calculus and future trajectory are highly uncertain, and its recent saber-rattling along NATO‘s eastern flank has heightened tensions throughout the region.NATO has no choice but to take the risk of conflict seriously, and increased U.S. military support for the Baltic nations is a crucial step.
Contemporary analysis of Russian foreign policy understandably focuses on Ukraine and the Caucasus, but real drama is unfolding much farther east. Having lost its European empire in the twentieth century, Russia may find that its biggest threat in the twenty-first is that of the loss of its Asian empire.
In the decades since Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan began working together to end the Cold War, much has changed. But one grim element of the old order war remains a constant: Mankind still possesses the knowledge and means to destroy itself with nuclear weapons, a capability increasingly outside the firm control of two alliances committed to maintaining their own versions of the status quo.How should today‘s thinkers and policymakers
The conflict in Ukraine might reach a turning point this summer as EU sanctions against Russia near their expiration date and the ‘Minsk II‘ ceasefire in eastern Ukraine comes under increasing strain. Russian troops arereportedlymassing near Ukraine‘s borders, and observers aredocumentingup to 80 daily ceasefire violations, including a separatist offensive last week. Ukrainian leaders are bracing for intensified violence in the
Given Moscow‘s apprehension toward dealing with the West on practical and reasonable terms, Westerners would be forgiven for asking whether Russia can ever be normal. The answer is crucial for the years and decades ahead, particularly since Putin fits a leadership mold: many Russian leaders have held power by adopting foreign influences and remaking them into more traditionally Russian forms. Expert Gregory Feifer explains.
The United States has used economic sanctions to address a wide range of undesirable activities, from Russian aggression in Ukraine, to human rights abuses in Syria, to cyberattacks from China and North Korea. Recently, U.S. President Barack Obama is employing sanctions for a new purpose: to deter international aggression and uphold international norms.
Anglo-American popular culture seldom depicts Russians as heroes or even good guys-unless they come from the novels of Leo Tolstoy and Boris Pasternak.
Driven out of Russia by a sanctions-ridden economy and tougher immigration policies, thousands of Tajiks face unemployment back home. Some turn to jihad.
As NATO, a guarantor of stability, retreats west, Central Asian states have become increasingly vulnerable to external and internal pressures. China and Russia see this as an opportunity to play chess in a sophisticated game to win influence in the region. The maneuvering between them will likely play itself out over oil and gas and export routes, particularly through the region‘s largest hydrocarbon producer, Kazakhstan.
Russian President Vladimir Putin is not as strong as he might seem, or, more important, as he might hope. Although Russiasupports fighters in Ukraine, invaded Georgia in 2008,sold missile systems to Iran, and recently threatenedDenmarkandLithuaniawith nuclear war, it is, in reality,a muted and restrained poweroperating in a system that no longer supports grand-scale intervention.
Two new books-Red Notice, by Bill Browder, andNothing Is True and Everything Is Possible, by Peter Pomerantsev-chronicle the boom times that Russia experienced in the first years of Vladimir Putin‘s rule. But now the party is over and a nasty hangover is setting in.